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DANIEL ABEBE

ONE VOICE OR MANY? THE POLITICAL
QUESTION DOCTRINE AND ACOUSTIC
D I S S O N A N C E I N F O R E I G N A F FA I R S

A common theme in foreign affairs law is the importance of the
US speaking with “one voice” to the international community.
Speaking with one voice, so the story goes, ensures that the US is
not embarrassed by multiple, inconsistent pronouncements from
the several states or the different branches of the national government when it takes a position on a foreign affairs issue.1 Such acoustic dissonance from the US could potentially result in a loss of
credibility, a reduced capacity to achieve foreign policy goals, and
a greater chance of conﬂict with other countries. So, when the
Constitution is unclear about the allocation of decision-making authority on an issue, but the President or the national government
speaks ﬁrst, the presumption in favor of speaking in one voice reduces the possibility of multiple governmental decision makers and
permits the US to act clearly and decisively in foreign affairs. While
it reduces acoustic dissonance, the presumption in favor of one voice
Daniel Abebe is Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
Author’s note: Many thanks to Aziz Huq and David Strauss for comments, and to
Stephanie de Padua and Lee Deppermann for excellent research assistance. All mistakes
are mine.
1
See Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 211 (1962) (“Not only does resolution of such [foreign
affairs] issues frequently turn on standards that defy judicial application, or involve the
exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature, but many
such questions uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the Government’s views.”) (emphasis
added).
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has two other effects as well: the centralization of foreign affairs
decision making in the federal government vis-à-vis the states2 and
centralization of foreign affairs decision making in the President
vis-à-vis Congress.
The Supreme Court applies several doctrines to effectuate the
one-voice preference in foreign affairs. For example, the Court has
developed preemption doctrines to limit the capacity of the states
to interfere with the national government’s prerogatives in foreign
affairs. In several cases,3 the courts have struck down state laws that
purport to interfere with congressional statutes or touch upon Congress’s Commerce Clause or Dormant Commerce Clause authority.
In each, the Court relied on a notion of speaking with one voice
in the face of potentially inconsistent state laws.4 Crudely stated,
when the federal government and the states act on the same foreign
affairs issue—even if the state acts ﬁrst—the one-voice presumption
tends to protect federal government decision making.
In regulating the President’s relationship with Congress, the
Court’s one-voice vehicle has been the political question doctrine.
As elucidated by the Court in Baker v Carr,5 the political question
doctrine serves to insulate the courts from adjudicating cases that
implicate issues that the Court views as properly resolved by the
political branches. In Baker, the Court outlined a six-factor test,
and this article focuses on one of special relevance for foreign affairs:
“the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question”:6 in other words,
when adjudicating the case would lead to the possibility of embarrassment by inhibiting the ability of the US to speak with one voice.
In effect, the political question doctrine, at least as applied in the
foreign affairs context, creates a ﬁrst-mover bias: since the ﬁrst
mover is generally the ﬁrst “voice” to speak authoritatively on a
foreign affairs issue, its voice beneﬁts from the presumption that
one voice is preferred. And, since the ﬁrst mover is most often the
President instead of Congress, the political question doctrine typically serves to insulate the President’s decision making from judicial
2
For a discussion of foreign affairs federalism, see Daniel Abebe and Aziz Z. Huq,
Foreign Affairs Federalism: A Revisionist Approach, Vand L Rev (forthcoming 2013).
3

For a review of the cases, see id at 7–14.

4

See notes 19–23.

5

See 369 US 186, 217 (1962).

6

See Baker, 369 US at 217.
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review. At bottom, one factor of the political question doctrine’s
multifactor test suggests that one voice is almost always preferred
and, given the President’s capacity to act more quickly than Congress, it effectively means that the one voice will likely belong to
the President.
Of course, the courts do not apply the political question doctrine
in every case that touches and concerns foreign affairs, and the
President does not always succeed in cases where the political question doctrine might be applicable—mostly because it is difﬁcult for
courts to weigh the political question factors. Sometimes, as a result,
the courts perhaps unwisely exercise jurisdiction over the most complicated and sensitive of foreign policy issues. For example, in Zivotofsky v Clinton, the Supreme Court declined to apply the political
question doctrine when confronted with the issue of whether Congress or the President had the authority to record the country of
birth on a US passport for naturalized US citizens born in Jerusalem.7 In vacating the decision of the US Court of Appeals for the
DC Circuit, the Court held that a congressional statute permitting
the designation of Israel as the country of birth for those persons
born in Jerusalem did not present a political question,8 despite the
fact that the statute directly conﬂicted with the State Department’s
“longstanding policy of not taking a position on the political status
of Jerusalem.”9 Rather, the Court held that the conﬂict was indeed
justiciable because it only “demands careful examination of the textual, structural, and historical evidence put forward by the parties
regarding the nature of the statute and of the passport and recognition powers”10 normally associated with judicial review, rather
than any consideration of delicate issues of international politics or
the merits of US foreign policy.
While Zivotofsky demonstrates that the President does not always
succeed in political question doctrine cases, the general operation
of the doctrine combined with the political economy of foreign
affairs decision making—the President as ﬁrst mover—provides lat7
See Zivotofsky v Clinton, 132 S Ct 1421, 1430 (2012) (“Recitation of [the parties’]
arguments—which sound in familiar principles of constitutional interpretation—is enough
to establish that this case does not ‘turn on standards that defy judicial application.’”)
(quoting Baker, 369 US at 211).
8

Id at 1430–31.

9

Id at 1424.

10

Id at 1430.
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itude to the President to engage in activities that might not be per
se constitutional but are later insulated by the Supreme Court’s
desire to avoid adjudication on the matter. What is less clear, however, is the wisdom of the one-voice presumption built into the
political question doctrine. Even with this presumption, the courts
lack a framework to distinguish between those foreign affairs issues
where speaking with one voice is particularly important and those
for which it is not. The political question doctrine, as currently
applied, sweeps too broadly and lacks a useful, workable metric for
distinguishing among foreign affairs cases, treating some as political
questions but failing to draw a principled or meaningful line. This
article begins that project.
This article examines the merits of the one-voice presumption
of the political question doctrine. It has two goals. First, it aims to
unpack the underlying assumptions supporting a presumption in
favor of one voice in foreign affairs to determine the conditions
under which the presumption holds. The traditional account about
speaking with one voice focuses on the beneﬁts of centralizing decision making in foreign affairs.11 The creation of foreign policy
and the provision of national security, among other things, are public goods best provided by the national government, rather than
the states. Relative to the national government, the states are not
as well placed to coordinate national policy and maximize social
welfare for all Americans; in fact, they are more likely to pursue
narrow, parochial policies that might be welfare enhancing for the
state, but not for the nation as a whole. Beyond that, the beneﬁts
of centralization in foreign affairs decision making are plainly obvious in the context of the national government and the ﬁfty states;
the possibility of dozens of inconsistent pronouncements from various sovereigns justiﬁes, to some degree, limits on foreign affairs
federalism. In fact, exactly this lack of centralization in foreign affairs substantially contributed to the collapse of the Articles of Confederation.
But while this traditional account might justify limits on foreign
affairs federalism and support a one-voice presumption for the relationship between the national government and the various states,
it is not as convincing when applied to the relationship between
President and Congress. Here, there are only two actors rather than
11
See Jenna Bednar, The Robust Federation: Principles of Design 25–52 (Cambridge, 2009)
(providing an account of the costs and beneﬁts of decentralization).
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potentially dozens, reducing the concern about problematic acoustic
dissonance. Moreover, Congress, unlike the states, is well placed to
engage in precisely the kind of trade-offs necessary to promote the
public good. Congress also has much more foreign affairs expertise
than the states, and the competency gap between Congress and the
President is much smaller than that between the national government and the states. It’s simply easier for Congress to solve collective action problems and reach decisions than the states. Along
each of these dimensions, the traditional account justifying the Supreme Court’s one-voice presumption is much weaker among the
branches of the national government.
Despite the weakness of the traditional account in this context,
it does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the political question doctrine’s emphasis on speaking with one voice is inappropriate
at all times. Rather, it suggests that the one-voice presumption likely
obtains only under certain external conditions. My second goal is
to tease out those conditions under which speaking with one voice
is most likely to produce the beneﬁts associated with the centralization of foreign affairs decision making for the US, and those
when the one voice might be unnecessary. Since we don’t know
how the courts weigh the different factors of the political question
doctrine, measure the potential for embarrassment, or evaluate risks
from multiple, inconsistent pronouncements, it might seem like a
fool’s errand to try to determine the conditions when these factors
are more or less salient. Nonetheless, we know that the courts, in
applying the political question doctrine, must engage in some ad
hoc analysis of these factors when deciding to apply the doctrine
or adjudicate the issue on the merits.
Building on prior scholarship on the role of international political
factors and the use of polarity as a metric in foreign affairs institutional design,12 I argue that the political question doctrine’s presumption for speaking with one voice should vary with the position
of the US in international politics. In simple terms, when the US
is in a highly competitive international political environment—for
example, when there are multiple powerful states or great powers
in the world—the courts should apply a presumption in favor of
speaking in one voice. Under this condition, speaking with one voice
12
See generally Daniel Abebe, The Global Determinants of U.S. Foreign Affairs Law, 49
Stan J Int’l L (forthcoming 2013) (developing a theory of foreign affairs law based on the
concept of polarity and changing geopolitical conditions).
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is likely more important because the costs of multiple inconsistent
pronouncements from the President, Congress, and the courts increase. Some of the values associated with the centralization of
foreign affairs decision making—for example, clear communication
of policy to the international community, speed of decision making,
and determination of the national interest—are of greater importance when the US is navigating a complicated international political environment and has less freedom to pursue its objectives.
In contrast, when the US is a superpower or the dominant state
in international politics—when it is the unipolar power—the necessity of rigidly adhering to a one-voice presumption diminishes.
Under this condition, the beneﬁts of centralization of foreign affairs
are still present, but not as salient, because the US is pursuing its
interests in a less challenging political environment. Stated simply,
the more complicated the environment, the higher the cost of acoustic dissonance between the branches. As the environment becomes
less complicated, the costs of acoustic dissonance decrease. Moreover, acoustic dissonance promotes transparency and public deliberation, values that are often sublimated in the multipolar world.
Using the concept of polarity as a metric,13 the wisdom of the
political question doctrine’s one-voice presumption is contingent
on or a function of the position of the US in international politics.
How would the courts operationalize this as a doctrinal matter?
The President certainly has institutional expertise in foreign affairs
relative to the courts, and the political question doctrine, at least
in the foreign affairs context, serves to ensure that the courts do
not weigh in on issues properly committed to the political branches.
At the same time, the political question doctrine requires the courts
to make a threshold foreign affairs determination, namely, whether
adjudication of the issue would cause the US embarrassment or
create foreign affairs problems. Since the courts have to make an
inquiry into geopolitical conditions anyway, the courts should simply apply a presumption in favor of speaking with one voice when
the international political environment is most challenging (multipolar worlds) and relax the presumption when the environment is
less challenging (the US as the superpower in the unipolar world).
Shifting the presumption in this way would align the political question doctrine’s rationale of centralizing decision-making authority
13

Id (developing this argument at length).
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when necessary, while still maintaining a role for the courts to
adjudicate issues properly before them when the costs of doing so
are likely to be lower. Moreover, it ensures that the political
branches—most likely the President—are still tasked with making
the foreign affairs determinations for which they are best suited.
And it provides much more reasoned guidance to the ad hoc application of the political question doctrine today.
Part I of this article examines the implicit assumptions underlying
the political question doctrine’s one-voice presumption. Part II proposes a metric to determine the conditions under which the onevoice presumption obtains and describes its operation. It concludes
by discussing the merits of the status quo in comparison to varying
the one-voice presumption based on changing geopolitical conditions.
I. The Political Question Doctrine in Foreign Affairs
a. the one-voice presumption
At its core, the political question doctrine is a justiciability limitation on federal court jurisdiction.14 Beginning with Marbury v
Madison,15 the Supreme Court has suggested that there are some
questions or issues that properly come before the courts that, by
their nature, are somehow political, and thus outside of the traditional scope of judicial review. When a court determines that
the matter before it presents a political question and thus applies
the political question doctrine, it refuses to adjudicate the matter
and in effect provides absolute discretion to the political branches
to resolve the matter.
Until the 1960s, the courts generally adopted a categorical approach to the political question doctrine in which some foreign
affairs questions were deemed to presumptively or automatically
require the application of the doctrine, removing them from the
14
See Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 210 (1962) (“Deciding whether a matter has in any
measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether
the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate
exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution.”).
15
See Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137, 164 (1803) (“Is the act of delivering or withholding
a commission to be considered as a mere political act belonging to the Executive department alone, for the performance of which entire conﬁdence is placed by our Constitution in the Supreme Executive, and for any misconduct respecting which the injured
individual has no remedy?”).
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purview of the courts. The categorical approach designated particular questions like those relating to the cessation of hostilities,
the territorial boundaries of the US, or whether the US should
recognize a government as the legitimate representative of a foreign nation as questions more appropriately resolved by the political branches. The categorical approach’s rule-like quality, however, meant that it lacked the ﬂexibility to deal with more nuanced
foreign affairs questions that touch and concern war or national
security but do not warrant the rigid application of the political
question doctrine.
The Supreme Court moved away from the categorical approach
in Baker v Carr.16 Though Baker addresses a wholly domestic question concerning a denial of equal protection in Tennessee relating
to legislative apportionment, Justice Brennan’s opinion for the
Court discusses the various applications of the political question
doctrine in the domestic and foreign affairs context and elucidates
a multifactor test to determine when the political question should
be applied.17 The most important factors include determining
whether there is textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate federal branch or a lack of
judicially discoverable or manageable standards for resolving the
issue. Although these two factors are most salient for the application of the political question doctrine, perhaps the factors of
greatest relevance in foreign affairs are concern about a lack of
respect for the coordinate branches of government and, most important, the possibility of embarrassment to the US from the lack
of “one voice.”
One way of characterizing the “one-voice” factor in the political
question doctrine is a concern that if the President, Congress, and
the courts each try to speak authoritatively to resolve a foreign
affairs issue, the possibility or likelihood of embarrassment for the
US would increase. To put it concretely, if, for example, the na16
See Baker v Carr, 369 US 186 (1962) (outlining the factors to be considered by courts
in applying the political question doctrine).
17
Id at 217 (“[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question” (emphasis added).
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tional government cannot speak clearly and articulate its position
on which government is the legitimate representative of Syria, the
US would suffer some embarrassment in the eyes of both the
domestic and international audience. Thus, the one-voice factor
serves to prevent or at least reduce the likelihood of embarrassment for the US in foreign affairs.
But what does embarrassment mean? The one-voice factor assumes that if the US speaks in multiple voices on an issue, the
possibility of embarrassment increases. But in fact the US regularly
and consistently speaks with multiple voices on many highly sensitive foreign affairs law questions. For example, just in the past
ten years the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court have
each spoken—and disagreed—on the President’s authority to create and set the standards for military commissions during the War
on Terror.18 The President, the Supreme Court, and the state of
Texas spoke with different voices on the President’s authority to
order a state to enforce a decision of the International Court of
Justice.19 The courts often consider and reject Statements of Interest by the Executive Branch regarding the foreign policy complications of international human rights litigation in Alien Tort
Statute cases.20 The truth is that the US often fails to speak in
one voice on many highly salient foreign affairs questions, making
concerns about potential embarrassment in the political question
doctrine seem somewhat antiquated.
Perhaps the one-voice factor and the concern about the possibility of embarrassment actually refer to something else, namely,
the important social welfare effects of concentrating or centralizing decision making in the political branches because of their
greater competency or expertise in foreign affairs.21 The wisdom
18
See Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 US 557 (2006) (invalidating the President’s military
commissions on grounds that it violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the
Geneva Conventions).
19
See Medellin v Texas, 552 US 491 (2008) (invalidating a memorandum from President
Bush purporting to order the state of Texas to enforce a judgment by the International
Court of Justice and set aside its procedural default rules for certain alien nationals). See
also Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon, 548 US 331 (2006) ( holding that the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations did not oust a state’s procedural default rules).
20
For a discussion on the Bush Administration’s use of statements of interest in Alien
Tort Statute cases, see generally Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush
Administration’s Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 Harv Hum Rts J 169 (2004).
21
For a discussion of institutional competency and the political question doctrine in
foreign affairs, see generally Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 Iowa L
Rev 941 (2004).
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of speaking with one voice rests on the beneﬁts of centralization
over decentralization in foreign affairs. On this reading, the onevoice factor in the political question doctrine represents not a
concern about embarrassment but rather the Supreme Court’s
view that the political branches are more competent in foreign
affairs than the courts, and its implicit assumption that centralization of decision making in the President should be generally
preferred. Rather than a concern about embarrassment, the logic
of one voice is better understood as resting on the merits of centralized decision making in foreign affairs.
b. one voice and centralization
The Supreme Court’s emphasis on centralized decision making
in foreign affairs is perhaps best exempliﬁed in its foreign affairs
federalism jurisprudence. The Constitution speciﬁcally limits the
participation of states in foreign affairs22 and, in the event of conﬂict between a federal statute and state law, the Supremacy Clause
ensures that the state law is preempted. But the Supreme Court
has also developed several preemption doctrines to ensure the
primacy of the national government over the states on a range of
foreign affairs questions, including ﬁeld preemption,23 obstacle
preemption,24 dormant foreign affairs preemption,25 and executive
preemption.26 In each of these areas, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on speaking with one voice has resulted in the centralization
of foreign affairs decision-making authority in the national government over the states.
What is the logic of this centralization? Much of it rests on
general understandings of the merits of centralization in institutional design. The common functionalist account justifying cen22

US Const, Art I, § 10, cl 11.
See Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US 52, 56 (1941) (invalidating a Pennsylvania statute
where Congress passed legislation to occupy the ﬁeld).
23

24
Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363, 373 (2000) (invalidating a Massachusetts “Burma” statute for creating “an obstacle to the accomplishment of the Congress’s full objectives under the federal act.”).
25
Zschernig v Miller, 389 US 429, 432 (1968) (striking down an Oregon statute as “an
intrusion . . . into the ﬁeld of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the
President and the Congress.”).
26
See American Insurance Association v Garamendi, 539 US 396, 420 (2003) (striking
down a California insurance statute because the “likelihood that [it] will produce something
more than incidental effect in conﬂict with express foreign policy of the National Government would require preemption of the state law.”).
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tralization of decision making in the national government focuses
on collective action problems and the provision of public goods.
National governments are best placed to coordinate public policy,
determine national interests, and engage in the necessary tradeoffs to promote national public welfare. Perhaps most central to
the responsibilities of the national government is the provision of
national security, the maintenance of a domestic market for trade,
and the generation of economic wealth. For example, in the security context, the national government can act as a single, integrated institutional actor to determine the national interest; develop US foreign policy; coordinate the military, diplomatic, and
intelligence resources of the nation; swiftly pursue national objectives; and prosecute wars. If the several states were tasked with
such responsibilities, it does not take much to imagine the difﬁculties in coordinating among a large number of heterogeneous
subnational governments, each with its own interests and desire
to pass on the cost of national defense, when possible, to its cosovereigns.
The same logic applies to the development and maintenance of
a common economic market and the promotion of policies to
encourage economic prosperity. The national government can aggregate information and coordinate policy to ensure that the US
can beneﬁt from international trade, encourage the production of
goods for which it has a competitive advantage, protect the national market from foreign anticompetitive behavior, and redistribute wealth, if necessary, to ameliorate the unequal distribution
of wealth across particular regions, states, or demographic groups.
The states, by contrast, will tend to be focused narrowly on their
own economic prosperity, and will produce economic policies that
allow them to reap the beneﬁts and externalize the costs. We can
imagine Alaska, Texas, and Louisiana, for example, adopting policies with respect to resource extraction that might impose environmental costs on the US as a whole, just as we can imagine
Massachusetts, California, and New York adopting regulatory policies that might limit the ability of the US as a whole to beneﬁt
from its resource endowment. In these contexts—national security,
trade, and economic prosperity—the beneﬁts of centralization
over vast decentralization among dozens of subnational entities
are clear.
Beyond this traditional account, there are less obvious but sim-
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ilarly important justiﬁcations for centralization in foreign affairs.
One is the clarity of the ensuing foreign policy. Even if there is
substantive disagreement over policy, clarity ensures at least in
theory that there is a clear communication of the US national
interest to friend and foe alike. Another is the designation of a
clear decision-making authority in foreign affairs. Among other
things, it reduces the likelihood of constitutional impasses over
key issues, provides an accountable governmental entity for the
domestic voting public, and encourages specialization over time.
Finally, to the extent the national government is working with
other countries on an issue of global concern, centralization designates the US representative for international policy coordination.
But if the logic of centralization in foreign affairs in the form
of speaking with one voice obtains in the context of the national
government vis-à-vis the states, it is not as clear that the same
logic holds with respect to Congress. In fact, the logic is not as
persuasive for at least two important reasons. First, the competency gap in foreign affairs between the national government and
the states far exceeds the gap between the President and Congress,
and even the gap between the political branches and the courts.
The states are very poorly placed to coordinate policy and make
foreign affairs determinations. The centralization of decision making and speaking in one voice are, accordingly, much more important when the institutional expertise of the national government is weighed against that of the state. But the President and
Congress both have signiﬁcant institutional resources to coordinate foreign policy and act decisively in foreign affairs, and are
speciﬁcally empowered by the Constitution to do so. Unlike the
states, Congress has institutional structures like the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, the House Armed Services Committee, and
dozens of subcommittees dedicated to foreign affairs and international politics, with each generating valuable information and
developing Congress’s foreign policy expertise. Thus, the necessity
of centralization and a uniﬁed voice between Congress and the
President is not as strong, and that perhaps weakens the common
justiﬁcations for the one-voice factor in the political question doctrine.
The same analysis applies to the gap between the political
branches and the courts. While in the aggregate the political
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branches are probably better placed to act in foreign affairs than
the courts, the courts certainly adjudicate many sensitive matters
that touch and concern foreign affairs, while the states are, for
the most part, uninvolved in such issues. From adjudicating delicate issues regarding the War on Terror27 to determining the
constitutionality of international human rights litigation under the
Alien Tort Statue,28 the Supreme Court is not only involved in
foreign affairs but also has developed some expertise in dealing
with politically sensitive issues. On institutional competency
grounds, the importance of centralization for purposes of limiting
foreign affairs federalism outweighs the salience of centralization
in foreign affairs decision making among the different branches
of the national government.
In addition, the concerns about the provision of public goods,
the coordination of national policy, and the potential collective
actions problems disappear when dealing with the President and
Congress. Both branches have the necessary institutional capacity
to determine the national interest and ameliorate collective action
concerns, far beyond anything the states could muster. Again,
while centralization makes sense when dealing with national government and the states, the logic is certainly weaker with respect
to the President and Congress. At bottom, the political question
doctrine’s one-voice factor rests on a conception of centralized
foreign affairs decision making that, while appropriate with respect
to the states, seems inapt for the coordinate branches of the national government.
II. One Voice and International Politics
a. effect of the one-voice factor in foreign affairs
The political question doctrine’s one-voice factor demonstrates
the Supreme Court’s concern with the potential embarrassment
for the US of failing to speak in a uniﬁed manner. On balance,
this factor privileges centralization of decision making in foreign
27
See Boumediene v Bush, 128 S Ct 2229, 2277 (2008) (“Within the Constitution’s
separation-of-powers structure, few exercises of judicial power are as legitimate or as
necessary as the responsibility to hear challenges to the authority of the Executive to
imprison a person.”).
28
See Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542 US 692 (2004) (upholding the constitutionality of
international human rights litigation under the Alien Tort Statute under limited circumstances).

246

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[2012

affairs. However, as we have seen so far, it is not clear what constitutes embarrassment for the US, as the US often speaks with
multiple voices in foreign affairs. Conceptually, it is not clear to
whom or to what the embarrassment attaches, or how the embarrassment affects the future pursuit of foreign affairs objectives.
And the justiﬁcations for centralization that appear so persuasive
with respect to limits on foreign affairs federalism and preemption
are much less convincing in the political question doctrine context.
Yet the one-voice factor, for reasons I will explain, may very
well serve to insulate the President’s foreign affairs decision making from judicial review. As we know from Curtiss-Wright 29 and
Belmont,30 the President is at least the chief representative of the
US in foreign affairs. While the President does not act alone—
Congress has foreign affairs authority as well—he tends to be the
“ﬁrst mover” in foreign affairs. The President has access to the
institutional resources of the Departments of State, Defense, and
Homeland Security and can respond more quickly to any foreign
affairs concerns. More concretely, in the face of particular foreign
affairs issues for which the Constitution isn’t clear and Congress
has not acted, or when the foreign policy interests of the US are
triggered in litigation properly before the courts, the President
generally moves ﬁrst on behalf of the US.
Since the President tends to be the ﬁrst mover, the political
question doctrine’s one-voice factor effectively creates a presumption in favor of the President’s action, even if it might very
well push the outer bounds of the President’s Article II authority.
Why? The incentive structure for members of Congress will likely
discourage them from acting to challenge the President, even if
they might think that he has surpassed his constitutional authority.
As an initial matter, the President’s party might very well control
Congress or be able to block legislation invalidating the President’s action. If so, Congress would be unable to act and protect
its institutional prerogatives. In addition, Congress rarely gets the
credit for foreign affairs successes or failures. Since the public
29
See United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 US 304, 320 (1936) (characterizing
“the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the
federal government in the ﬁeld of international relations . . .”).
30
See United States v Belmont, 301 US 324, 330 (1937) (“Governmental power over
external affairs is not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national government.
And in respect of what was done here, the Executive had authority to speak as the sole
organ of that government.”).
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generally perceives the President as the dominant actor in foreign
affairs, there is little beneﬁt to challenging the President until it
becomes clear that his policies have failed. Thus, the President in
theory can act, and if his actions or policies are successful—even
if the actions are beyond his constitutional authority—Congress
is unlikely to respond.31
The one-voice factor in the political question doctrine exacerbates this dynamic. The courts, worried about their capacity to
make foreign affairs determinations, sensitive to their relative
weakness in enforcing their decisions, and lacking contrary legislation from Congress upon which to base a decision, are likely
to weigh heavily the political question doctrine’s emphasis on
speaking with one voice. Thus, to the extent the courts rely on
the one-voice factor in applying the political question doctrine,
they essentially validate the President’s action. Since the President
generally moves ﬁrst and Congress is disincentivized to act, the
one-voice factor creates a ﬁrst-mover bias and insulates the President’s action from judicial review.
b. one voice or acoustic dissonance?
Some might immediately ask why this is a problem. After all,
the President is the chief actor in foreign affairs and likely has
the deepest institutional knowledge and expertise in the area: if
the political question doctrine creates a bias in favor of the President, the bias is running in the right direction. This bias, however,
creates two kinds of problems.
First, the logic of speaking with one voice, whether resting on
concerns about embarrassment for the US or drawn from the
merits of centralization in another context, is not as powerful as
the political question doctrine suggests. Despite this weak ediﬁce,
the ﬁrst-mover bias almost always privileges the President’s foreign affairs decision making whether or not it is consistent with
the Constitution. Though it doesn’t mean that the President will
always prevail—there are other political question factors that the
courts consider—the ﬁrst-mover bias may very well overprivilege
the President’s actions because it unrealistically assumes that a
31
William G. Howell and John C. Pevehouse, While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks
on Presidential War Powers (Princeton, 2007) (describing the conditions under which Congress inﬂuences the President’s use of force).
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more vigorous and active Congress would be willing to challenge
him. Since we don’t know how courts weigh the different factors
in applying the political question doctrine, the ﬁrst-mover bias
combined with the one-voice factor might be doing much more
work than it should.
Second, the ﬁrst-mover bias doesn’t vary; speaking with one
voice is always privileged. But speaking with one voice might be
especially important under some conditions, and much less important under others. Consider a crude distinction between highstakes and low-stakes foreign affairs issues. For example, when the
US is at war, or trying to determine whether a mutual-defense
treaty requires it to come to the aid of an ally, or even deciding
whether to exercise its veto on the United Nations Security Council, we might think that speaking with one voice is especially important. The resolution of foreign affairs questions relating to war,
the defense of treaty partners, and other potential national security
concerns requires the kind of quick, clear, and decisive action
generally associated with the political branches—speciﬁcally the
President—rather than the courts. We might characterize these
as exactly the high-stakes foreign affairs issues for which speaking
in a uniﬁed voice, on balance, makes sense; the beneﬁts of centralizing decision making in the more competent political branches
will likely generate better outcomes than a more ponderous decision-making process by the courts.
But just as we can imagine the type of high-stakes issue for
which the one-voice presumption is appropriate, we can also imagine low-stakes issues for which centralizing decision making might
be less urgent. Take the seemingly important question of the US
position on which government is the legitimate representative of
a country. Some might view this as a complicated foreign affairs
issue for which speaking with a uniﬁed voice through the President
is absolutely necessary. However, not all foreign affairs questions
of this kind require the quick, decisive action that centralization
in the President provides. For example, it is hard to see why the
delicate question of whether the US should recognize the recently
ousted President Nasheed or the current incumbent President
Waheed as the legitimate representative of the government of the
Republic of the Maldives necessarily requires the exclusion of
Congress or the courts. We can imagine that there are geographically concentrated interest groups with both foreign affairs ex-

7]

POLITICAL QUESTIONS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS

249

pertise and strong policy preferences about the appropriate US
policy outcome, giving Congress a legitimate interest in creating
policy. In fact, careful deliberation by the political branches together, buttressed by judicial review, might be beneﬁcial in determining the appropriate policy outcome. In other words, acoustic dissonance, in some cases and under certain conditions, may
have value.
So when will acoustic dissonance—or speaking with multiple
voices—be beneﬁcial and when will it create costs? Acoustic dissonance in foreign affairs will, at times, reduce the ability of the
US to react clearly and decisively. As described above, when the
US is dealing with a core foreign affairs issue that implicates national security or a sensitive foreign policy objective, the beneﬁts
of centralizing decision making are clearer. The one-voice factor
in the political question doctrine makes most sense when the US
is dealing with vital foreign policy concerns for which acting with
speed and dispatch is necessary. For high-stakes or exigent foreign
affairs issues, a presumption in favor of one voice seems appropriate.
However, when the US is dealing with a foreign affairs issue
for which the speed and dispatch associated with centralized decision making is not as crucial, the one-voice presumption might
be less important. Again, the discussion above of high-stakes and
low-stakes foreign issues illustrates exactly this concern. In lowstakes cases, we might ﬁnd that acoustic dissonance improves decision making by encouraging Congress to engage the President
in foreign affairs. Open, careful deliberation about foreign affairs
questions leads to greater transparency and democratic legitimacy.
Since greater congressional involvement in foreign affairs in lowstakes questions will likely lead to more opportunities for judicial
review, acoustic dissonance prevents the atrophy of oversight that
the one-voice factor creates. The courts’ willingness to adopt a
one-voice presumption in low-stakes cases could reduce the judiciary’s future capacity to engage in a meaningful review of the
President in foreign affairs, concretize the ﬁrst-mover bias in favor
of the President, and disincentivize the President, over time, to
employ his own intrabranch review mechanisms. This phenomenon is exacerbated by a dynamic effect, whereby the President’s
expertise and decision-making preeminence become self-afﬁrming
over time, and congressional enfeeblement becomes increasingly
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pathological. In low-stakes foreign affairs cases, the presumption
in favor of one voice is weaker and acoustic dissonance may be
appropriate.
c. acoustic dissonance and international politics
All of this might make sense in theory. But when courts consider
whether or not to apply the political question doctrine and weigh
the various factors, they will struggle to distinguish the high-stakes
cases that might warrant a one-voice presumption from the lowstakes cases where acoustic dissonance might be useful. While
courts have experience adjudicating foreign affairs questions, it is
not clear that they have the necessary foreign policy expertise to
make ﬁne-grained distinctions between seemingly high-stakes and
low-stakes foreign affairs questions. Nonetheless, courts routinely
make those determinations when they apply the political question
doctrine. For example, in order to determine whether there is a
possibility of embarrassment to the US by failing to speak with
one voice, the courts must make some threshold inquiry about the
importance of the foreign affairs issue, the likelihood of embarrassment, and the consequences of that embarrassment on US
foreign policy objectives. Yet we don’t know how the courts make
this inquiry or assessment in deciding whether the application of
the political question doctrine is merited. Thus the courts—or,
perhaps more accurately, individual judges—engage in an ad hoc
analysis without the beneﬁt of a framework to guide their reasoning.
While a more categorical approach to the political question
doctrine would carry the beneﬁts commonly associated with
rules—clarity, ease of administration, and low decision costs—it
is probably too rigid to deal with the great variety of foreign affairs
issues commonly before the courts. The late-twentieth-century
rise of international human rights litigation under the Alien Tort
Statute,32 for example, implicates sensitive foreign affairs issues
that make a rule-like approach to the political questions doctrine
a poor ﬁt with the complex transnational litigation seen in US
courts today. The increasing intermingling of foreign and domestic issues and the collapse of any meaningful deﬁnitional dis32
See Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542 US 692 (2004) (upholding international human rights
litigation under the Alien Tort Statute under limited circumstances).
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tinction between the two only weakens the value of the categorical
approach. But if courts lack the institutional competency to assess
complicated foreign affairs questions, and the nature of modern
litigation so routinely implicates foreign affairs that it makes a
categorical issue-by-issue approach unworkable, how should
courts determine when speaking with one voice (or acoustic dissonance) is appropriate?
Courts can gain traction on this question by assessing the background conditions of international politics to understand when a
presumption in favor of speaking with one voice is warranted, and
when such a presumption is unnecessary. As I have argued in prior
scholarship,33 the courts can adopt a parsimonious framework,
based on the international relations concept of polarity, to assess
background international political conditions and the role of the
US in the world. Based on this assessment, the courts would not
decide whether a particular foreign affairs question required the
application of the political question doctrine; rather, the assessment would assist the courts in weighing the beneﬁts of speaking
with one voice.
International theorists often describe the structure of international politics in terms of polarity.34 Polarity is a heuristic that
permits a simple, if somewhat crude, measure of the material
power of the most inﬂuential states in international politics. By
looking at a rough measurement of a state’s economic wealth and
military strength, scholars and judges can identify the most powerful countries in the world and focus attention on them. Such
identiﬁcation is particularly important in the foreign affairs context because, on average, the most powerful countries are best
placed to inﬂuence international politics.
Polarity refers to the number of great powers (powerful states
in the world). A multipolar system reﬂects a world in which there
are three or more great powers. Similarly, a bipolar system is a
world with two great powers, and a unipolar system is one with
only one great power or hegemon in international politics. Each
of these systems presents different challenges or background con33

See Abebe, 49 Stan J Int’l L (cited in note 12).
For a general discussion about polarity in international politics, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Norton, 2001); Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of
International Politics (McGraw-Hill, 1979).
34
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ditions, and these conditions are relevant for understanding the
importance of speaking with once voice.
To make the illustration simple, let’s imagine that it is the year
2030 and the US is one of three great powers in a multipolar
world, along with Germany and China. Each of these great powers
will have different and often competing economic goals, security
interests, and national objectives, drawn from their respective cultures, histories, and resource endowments. Each will develop policies designed to achieve their goals and will look to build relationships with other states to advance their interests. In a world
with ﬁnite resources, these great powers will compete, conﬂict,
and perhaps even clash as they pursue their foreign policy objectives.
The multipolar world presents a complex and challenging international political environment for the US. Since it is competing
with China and Germany as a relative equal, the US incurs great
costs in trying to achieve its objectives. In a multipolar world, the
returns to speaking with one voice and centralizing foreign affairs
decision making will likely be high. The US is not a global superpower and lacks the material power and political inﬂuence to
ignore China and Germany as it pursues its policies. In fact, the
US has to be careful to calibrate its foreign policy goals and the
means to achieve them to minimize conﬂict with China and Germany, just as China and Germany exercise care vis-à-vis the US.
Here, the President’s foreign affairs expertise, institutional knowledge, and capacity to marshal resources and act quickly are especially beneﬁcial given the particularly challenging international
political environment that the US must navigate. To put it differently, the beneﬁts of acoustic dissonance that emerge from careful, open, and deliberate consideration of policy are unlikely to
be realized in a more complicated world requiring high levels of
expertise and decisive action. Under this condition, a presumption
in favor of speaking with one voice—through the one-voice factor
in the political question doctrine—is appropriate. Such a presumption links the centralization of foreign affairs decision making
through speaking with one voice with the international political
environment in which it is most useful.
In contrast, consider a unipolar world with the US as the hegemon or the unipolar power in international politics. Here, the
US stands alone; by deﬁnition, there are no other great powers
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that can approximate the material power and political inﬂuence
of the US. Of course, there are other powerful states in the world,
but none of them is a peer of the US, the sole superpower. In the
unipolar world, the President still has valuable foreign affairs expertise useful for the pursuit of the national interest, but the necessity of acting with speed, secrecy, and dispatch is not as urgent.
Since the US is dominant, it has greater latitude to develop foreign
policy, deﬁne more broadly the national interest, and pursue national objectives because the potential for serious conﬂict with
peer states is reduced. Stated slightly differently, the error costs
tend to be lower. This does not mean that the US is free to do
what it wants in international politics—it simply suggests that
relative to a multipolar world, the unipolar world reduces some
of the concerns that speaking with one voice or centralization
address.
It also leads to a different reading of the one-voice factor in the
political question doctrine. Again, the structure of international
politics is simply a background condition that helps inform the
merits of centralization. In the unipolar world, the need for centralization in foreign affairs is not as acute as it is in the multipolar
world. And, in the same unipolar world, the beneﬁts of acoustic
dissonance increase. Since the US is a superpower, the international political environment is not as complicated or taxing as the
more challenging multipolar world. This permits the US to act
with greater transparency and less haste, engage in more open
deliberation, and encourage greater participation of Congress and
the courts. At the same time, centralizing decision making still has
some role to play; the President still maintains a high level of
expertise regardless of whether the US is in a multipolar or unipolar world. Thus, to ensure that the President’s expertise and the
value of centralization are captured by the doctrine, while still
proﬁting from the virtues of some acoustic dissonance, the onevoice presumption should be relaxed when the US is the dominant
power in a unipolar world. That is, the burden of demonstrating
the necessity of speaking with one voice on a particular foreign
affairs question should rest with the ﬁrst mover, generally the
President.
d. conclusion: status quo versus shifting presumptions
Treating the one-voice factor as presumption that shifts ac-
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cording to international political conditions represents an improvement on the status quo for several reasons. First, it is information generating and only applies under the conditions when
the costs of deliberation and information production are likely to
be lowest. In practice, the President enjoys the presumption in a
multipolar world, when the beneﬁts of speaking with one voice
and centralization of foreign affairs decision making are most important to the US. Similarly, the President bears the burden of
showing that the one-voice presumption is necessary in a unipolar
world, when the beneﬁts of acoustic dissonance are more apparent.
Either way, the President has the opportunity, in both the unipolar
and multipolar world, to insulate his decision making from review
by making a showing that speaking with one voice is appropriate.
Second, the information-generating component of the shifting
presumption will likely result in a better-informed judiciary on
foreign affairs issues and, in some instances, result in better policy
outcomes. At the very least, it encourages greater participation by
Congress and the courts in foreign affairs when such participation
will likely produce the most beneﬁts and the least cost: in a unipolar world. Third, this approach brings some clarity to the current operation of the one-voice factor as part of the political question doctrine’s multifactor balancing test. It is less manipulable
than traditional standards, but more ﬂexible than rules. Finally,
rather than leaving judges without guidance in weighing the multiple factors or determining whether to use the political question
doctrine to insulate the President’s action from review, the approach outlined here provides the courts with a more rigorous,
parsimonious, and easily applicable framework for thinking about
the merits of speaking in one voice in foreign affairs.
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